Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
1-2005

Discretion as Delegation: The 'Proper' Understanding of the
Nondelegation Doctrine
Gary S. Lawson
Boston University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Gary S. Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The 'Proper' Understanding of the Nondelegation Doctrine , in
George Washington Law Review 235 (2005).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/2555

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at
Boston University School of Law. For more information,
please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

Discretion as Delegation: The "Proper"
Understanding of the
Nondelegation Doctrine
Gary Lawson*
Introduction
The nondelegation doctrine, as it has been traditionally understood,
maintains that the federal Constitution places limits (however modest) on the
kind and quantity of discretion that Congress can grant to other actors. Eric
Posner and Adrian Vermeule have recently described this doctrine as a "neurotic burden"' on the legal system that "lacks any foundation in constitutional text and structure, in standard originalist sources, or in sound
economic and political theory. ''2 They agree that the Constitution forbids
Congress from delegating the formal power to enact legislation through the
Article I voting process, 3 but they argue that "a statutory grant of authority
to the executive branch or other agents can never amount to a delegation of
legislative power, '' 4 no matter how much or what kind of discretion the statute grants. They have recently reaffirmed this stark view of the nondelega-5
tion doctrine in response to criticisms by Larry Alexander and Sai Prakash;
their latest declaration is that "the standard nondelegation doctrine has no
real pedigree in constitutional text and structure, in originalist understandings, or in judicial precedent; nor can plausible arguments from democratic
'6
theory or social welfare be marshaled to support it."
The recent exchange among Professors Alexander, Prakash, Posner, and
Vermeule covers important and interesting issues ranging from the meaning
of legislative power 7 to the proper interpretation of John Locke's pronounce*

Professor, Boston University School of Law.

1 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine,69 U. CHI. L.

1721, 1723 (2002).
2 Id. at 1722.
3 See id. at 1723 ("[W]e agree that the Constitution bars the 'delegation of legislative
power.' In our view, however, the content of that prohibition is the following: Neither Congress
nor its members may delegate to anyone else the authority to vote on federal statutes or to
exercise other de jure powers of federal legislators.").
4 Id.
5 See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine's
Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. Cm. L. REV. 1297 (2003).
6 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Nondelegation: A Post-Mortem, 70 U. Cm. L. REV.
1331, 1331 (2003). Posner and Vermeule are not entirely alone in their criticism of the traditional nondelegation doctrine. Kenneth Davis has long urged that the standard nondelegation
doctrine is a judicial invention without constitutional foundation, see, e.g., 1 KENNETH CULP
DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.6, at 66 (3d ed. 1994),
and Justices Stevens and Souter have expressed similar views, see Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 489 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
7 See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 5, at 1304-20; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6,
at 1338-41.
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ments on delegation,8 but it does not engage the central constitutional question concerning delegation: does the Constitution in fact place limits on the
kind and quantity of discretion that Congress may grant? Alexander and
Prakash "have sympathy for the conventional nondelegation doctrine," but
they make clear that they "have not sought to prove that the conventional
nondelegation doctrine is the one enshrined in the Constitution.' 10
I seek to prove it here. I firmly resist Posner and Vermeule's prescribed
"course of therapy"1 -which seems more like a lobotomy-for the law's alleged nondelegation neurosis. As far as the original meaning of the Constitution is concerned, the traditional nondelegation doctrine, while not always
formulated by courts or scholars in the most felicitous fashion and almost
never applied properly by government actors, reflects a real principle embedded in the Constitution. Just as paranoids can sometimes have enemies, neurotic legal systems can occasionally worry about real problems. It is a
genuine constitutional problem if Congress grants improper discretion to
other actors.
This Article demonstrates that the traditional nondelegation doctrine, at
least in its most general guise, has a solid constitutional grounding. To be
sure, I do not defend the dominant modern formulation of that doctrine that
regards an "intelligible principle" 12 as the touchstone for a constitutional
grant of discretion. I similarly do not defend modern applications of the doctrine, which effectively treat it as a nullity. 13 Elsewhere, I have described at
length the precise version of the nondelegation principle that I think is contained in the Constitution. 14 As aptly formulated by Chief Justice Marshall
nearly 200 years ago, the nondelegation doctrine distinguishes "those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from
those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power
given to those who are to act under such general provisions to fill up the
details. '15 Or, as I have restated (without necessarily improving upon) Chief
Justice Marshall's formulation, "[i]n every case, Congress must make the central, fundamental decisions, but Congress can leave ancillary matters to the
President or the courts.' 6 But the precise formulation of the delegation
8 See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 5, at 1320-23; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6,
at 1339, 1342.
9 Alexander & Prakash, supra note 5, at 1299.
10 Id. at 1328.
11 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1723.
12 J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
13 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472-76 (2001) (upholding as
constitutional a grant of authority to the Environmental Protection Agency to set air quality
standards that are "requisite to protect the public health," 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000)).
14 See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REv. 327 (2002). Needless to say, this effort was not well received by the therapeutic community. See, e.g., Posner &
Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1728 n.20, 1730, 1736 n.61.
15 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825) (emphasis added).
16 Lawson, supra note 14, at 376-77. Both formulations, of course, sound absurdly circular. They are in fact circular, but not absurdly so.
One can try to find alternative ways to express the distinction between fundamental
and ancillary matters, such as focusing on case-resolving power or demonstration of
political commitment or choices among salient alternatives, but in the end, one
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principle is not critical to this Article. My point here is only that the Constitution contains some limitation on the extent to which Congress can grant
discretion to other actors; that abstract principle is what I describe as the
"traditional nondelegation doctrine." Once the principle is established, we
can always, as the old joke goes, haggle over the price.
Accordingly, this Article explains in detail how statutes vesting undue
discretion in executive (or any other) actors exceed Congress's enumerated
power under the Sweeping Clause of Article 1,17 because laws vesting excessive discretion in the executive (or in any other actor) 18 are not "necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution" federal powers. Such laws are either
not necessary, not proper, or both. They are not "necessary" when they fail
to have, as James Madison put it, an "obvious and precise affinity"' 19 with
whatever federal power they seek to execute. Even when such laws are "necessary," they are not "proper" when they charge the President with excessive
discretion. The essence of the executive power is "the execution of validly
enacted law,"' 20 but a law that exceeds Congress's power under the Sweeping
Clause is not "validly enacted" and therefore does not count as "law" that
the President may permissibly execute. That is what the traditional nondelegation doctrine rests upon, and it is right.
Along the way, I will make a number of observations about Posner and
Vermeule's interpretative methodology, which in many respects seriously
misunderstands originalism. To be sure, some of these observations are more
than a bit unfair to Posner and Vermeule. Originalists are creatures that
come in many different shapes and sizes-and those shapes and sizes are
often fuzzy and shifting. Accordingly, it is understandable that Posner and
Vermeule would cast a broad net to catch as many of these elusive and
chameleonic creatures as they can. Nonetheless, it is not unreasonable to ask
them to tailor their tools and traps a bit more precisely to the different species that they are hunting.
As anyone remotely familiar with my work can attest, I would not dream
of criticizing Posner and Vermeule, or anyone else, for challenging entrenched, traditional understandings. The fact that a view is traditional does
not make it right. But, occasionally, conventional wisdom is conventional
cannot really get behind or beneath the fact that law execution and application
involve discretion in matters of "less interest" but turn into legislation when that
discretion extends to "important subjects." That is the line that the Constitution
draws, and there is no escape from it.
Id. at 377.
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress the power to "make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof"). Although it has become conventional in modern times to call this
clause the "Necessary and Proper Clause," the founding generation uniformly called it the
Sweeping Clause. If it was good enough for them, it's good enough for me.
18 For ease of exposition, I will henceforth speak only of discretion vested in the President.
The same arguments developed here, however, apply to discretion vested in courts or other
actors.
19 Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 THE WRrrrNGS OF
JAMES MADISON 447, 448 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1908).
20 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1730.
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precisely because it is wisdom. The nondelegation doctrine represents conventional wisdom in this sense.
L

Where Do We Start? An Interpretative Introduction

To use an example of which I have become inordinately fond, 21 suppose
that Congress passes the Goodness and Niceness Act of 2004. Section 1 of
the statute outlaws all transactions involving interstate or foreign commerce
that do not promote goodness and niceness. Section 2 of the statute provides
that the President shall define the content of this statute by promulgating
regulations to promote goodness and niceness in all matters involving commerce and shall specify penalties for violations of those regulations. As far as
Posner and Vermeule are concerned, this statute seems perfectly constitutional. It does not grant to the President, or anyone else, the power to vote
on legislation. It gives the President a specific, if open-ended, instruction;
and to the extent that the President follows the instruction by promulgating
goodness and niceness regulations, he 22 would appear simply to be exercising
the "executive Power" 23 to carry into effect legislative enactments. If Congress is exercising its legislative power by enacting a statute and the President
is exercising his executive power by obeying it, what's the problem? What, if
anything, in the Constitution says that Congress cannot enact such a statute?
That is the wrong question. The right question is: what, if anything, in
the Constitution says that Congress can enact such a statute? Congress, as
with all federal institutions, can only exercise those powers conferred upon it
by the Constitution. That is what is meant by "enumerated powers."
The second section of the Goodness and Niceness Act, which instructs
the President to define the content of the first section, is not authorized by
the Commerce Clause.24 That clause empowers Congress "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes. '25 The statutory provision authorizing presidential regulations
does not regulate commerce. It does not (unlike the first section of the hypothetical statute) command or forbid any conduct. Instead, it identifies a person who is authorized to command or forbid, i.e., regulate, conduct. The only
power conferred by the Commerce Clause is the power to regulate, and a
statute that identifies a regulator of conduct does not itself regulate. That
does not mean, of course, that the statute is unconstitutional. It simply
means that constitutional authorization for the statute must be found somewhere other than in the Commerce Clause.
21 See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 49-50 (3d ed. 2004); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1239 (1994).
22 The Constitution uses a generic male pronoun for the President. See, e.g., U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 7, cl. 2. I follow that practice without endorsing it.
23 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
24 Is the first section authorized by the Commerce Clause? Only if there is no real content
to the term "regulate." Even then, the law could not constitutionally be enforced unless the
enforcement provisions are authorized by the Sweeping Clause. But that is all beside the point
here.
25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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The obvious place to look for constitutional authorization is the Sweeping Clause, which provides that Congress may "make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers [identified in Article I, Section 8], and all other Powers vested by this Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof. '26 Perhaps the second section of the Goodness and Niceness Act is
permissible because it helps "carry[ ] into Execution" the commerce power
that Congress has exercised in the first section.
The Sweeping Clause, however, does not authorize all laws that help
carry into execution federal powers. It only authorizes laws that are "necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" those powers. 27 Is the section of
the Goodness and Niceness Act that authorizes the President to define goodness and niceness "necessary and proper" for carrying into execution the
commerce power?
I seek to answer questions of that sort by reference to the Constitution's
original meaning. There are, of course, plenty of other ways in which one can
try to answer them, but they do not concern me here. Posner and Vermeule
have sought to ground at least part of their case in terms of original meaning,
and that is the only part that I am addressing.28
In order to search for original meaning, one must know for what one is
searching. A number of originalists, and a somewhat larger number of nonoriginalists, often treat the search for original meaning as though it was a
quest for the subjective mental states of some group of framers, ratifiers, or
citizens. I do not. Properly understood, original meaning is a hypothetical
rather than historicalmental state. The ultimate question of original meaning
is: "What would a fully informed public audience at the relevant [original]
point in time, in possession of all relevant information about the Constitution
and the world around it, have understood the Constitution to mean? '29 Such
an approach "best captures the real nature of argumentation concerning documentary meaning. '30 Both in the eighteenth century and today,
people give reasons for their views of meaning, and those reasons
do not inevitably reduce to some method for adding actual mental
states. Those reasons can involve pointing out some feature of the
document that one's opponents have not yet seen, or have undervalued, or have refused to acknowledge for political or other reasons.
In other words, they refer to mental states that would or might exist
under counterfactual circumstances. Those reasons can also, of
Id. art. I, § 8, cl.18.
See id.
28 Accordingly, I have no comment on Posner and Vermeule's policy arguments against a
nondelegation principle, nor do I care to engage them at length about the proper reading of
precedents-although I will gratuitously offer that their treatment of Chief Justice Marshall's
sophisticated reasoning in Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825), is particularly
problematic. Compare Lawson, supra note 14, at 355-61 (reading the case correctly), with Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1738-39 (doing otherwise).
29 GARY LAWSON & Guy SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITuTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL ExPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 9 (2004).
30 Id.
26
27
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course, include reference to actual mental states; one can certainly
invoke the numbers, the eminence, or both of the proponents of a
particular viewpoint. But those actual mental states are evidence of
meaning; they are not constitutive of meaning. That is how dissenting voices on meaning can maintain, without absurdity, that they are
right and the majority is wrong. And majorities typically do not
consider it a full and complete response to any arguments about
out that the dissenting voices are not as loud as
meaning to point
31
the majority's.
In order to distinguish this species of originalism from other variants, one
should call it something like "reasonable-observer originalism."
My interpretative focus on the hypothetical mental states of hypothetical
fully informed observers, while not entirely idiosyncratic, 32 is likely to raise
the hackles even of many self-described originalists. After all, how can the
Constitution's authority as binding law possibly be grounded in what a hypothetical audience would have hypothetically believed?
This response, however, is grounded in a very basic, and very common,
mistake about interpretation. It conflates the question of what the Constitution means with the very different question of why (or whether) anyone
should care what the Constitution means. The first question is the only legitimate province of interpretative theory; the second question is in the domain
of moral theory.33 While it is an overstatement to say that never the twain
shall meet, questions about the Constitution's meaning and questions about
its authority do spend most of their time at a comfortable distance from each
other.34 One must determine what the Constitution actually means before
one can intelligently decide whether that meaning has moral significance; a
good interpreter does not let moral presuppositions get in the way of the
search for meaning. And the best account of constitutional meaning is rea35
sonable-observer originalism.
Operationally, the difference between reasonable-observer originalism
and "intentionalist" approaches concerns the weight that is properly given to
pieces of evidence rather than the admissibility of that evidence. Reasonable-observer originalism focuses on what a fully informed, unbiased observer
would have concluded after weighing all relevant evidence. The expressed
Id. at 10.
See, e.g., Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEo. L.J. 1113, 1132 (2003).
33 This is very bad news for the second question. One of the few things in this world more
depressing than moral theory is moral theory in the hands of law professors and judges.
34 For a more detailed discussion of the distinction between constitutional meaning and
constitutional authority, see Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes ...and Constitutions, 85 GEO.
L.J. 1823 (1997). For a brief discussion of the modest extent to which interpretation is necessarily a normative enterprise (which concerns the standard of proof for legal propositions), see
LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 29, at 208 n.15. And for those who will not shut up until I say
whether I consider the Constitution's original meaning to be normatively binding, the answer is,
"Yes, for public officials," but I do not believe that I can defend that position with the intellectual rigor appropriate to academic writing.
35 For a more extended discussion of this approach, see LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note
29, at 7-12; Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 32.
31

32
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views of concrete historical individuals can provide modest evidence of what
a reasonable observer would have concluded, but they are hardly the touchstone of an inquiry into meaning. Actual participants in actual debates were
not always in possession of all relevant information, were not always unbiased observers, and were not always (given the real-world stakes involved)
necessarily honest about their own thoughts or their perceptions of the
thoughts of others. This is true of all forms of expressed views, including
statements or actions of framers or ratifiers, statements or actions of legislators or executive officials, and statements or actions of judges. Precedents,
whether testimonial, legislative, or judicial, are relatively weak evidence of
original meaning. Such evidence generally pales before evidence drawn from
text, structure, interpretative conventions, and general background understandings about language, the document in question, and the world in which
the document is embedded.
For intentionalist originalists, direct statements or actions of concrete
historical individuals are very persuasive evidence of original meaning. The
same is true for "Burkean" or "traditionalist" originalists, who see practices,
and especially founding-era practices, as good evidence of original meaning.
For such interpreters, materials such as "the records of the constitutional
convention, the ratification debates, The Federalist,and early governmental
practice" 36 may well be, as Posner and Vermeule describe them, "the canonical originalist sources. '37 For reasonable-observer originalists such as myself,
however, such sources carry a lot of baggage relative to their probative value.
To us, "arguments from structure and 'first principles' can easily outweigh
even very impressive evidence about concrete historical understandings.
38
Original understandings were not necessarily original meanings.
Given this methodology, the task is to figure out what the words "necessary and proper," as they appear in the Sweeping Clause, would have meant
to a fully informed reasonable observer of the Constitution in 1788.
At least one thing is very clear: the words would have meant something.
They are not ciphers or embellishments. The Sweeping Clause does not say
or mean that Congress may employ any means whatsoever to implement
valid legislative ends. Nor does it say that Congress, in its discretion, is the
sole judge of the necessity and propriety of executory laws. There are clauses
in the Constitution that actually say that sort of thing, 39 but the Sweeping
Clause, which refers to laws that objectively "shall be necessary and
proper, '40 is not one of them. The central question with respect to the
nondelegation doctrine is therefore: can laws conferring discretion on execu36

Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1733.

37

Id.

& SEIDMAN, supra note 29, at 12.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (Congress may "vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President. .. , in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads
of Departments" (emphasis added)). For other examples and a detailed contrast of those provisions with the objective requirements of the Sweeping Clause, see Gary Lawson & Patricia B.
Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A JurisdictionalInterpretationof the Sweeping
Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 276-85 (1993).
40 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added).
38
39
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tive actors ever fail to be "necessary and proper for carrying into Execution"
federal powers?
Before we answer this question, one further methodological point bears
mention. Posner and Vermeule insist that proponents of the nondelegation
doctrine bear the burden of showing "that the Constitution contains some
implicit principle that constrains the permissible scope or precision of otherwise valid statutory grants."' 41 This burden is heavy, they claim, because it
must overcome the inference against implied limitations on congressional
powers generated by the express limitations contained in Article I, Section
9.42 They have matters exactly backwards. Under the principle of enumerated powers, all exercises of federal power must affirmatively be grounded in
a constitutional enumeration that authorizes the actor or institution in question to perform the relevant act. Only if such an authorization can be found
do we then ask whether anything in the Constitution affirmatively prohibits
the otherwise authorized exercise of power. Grants of discretion by Congress must find affirmative authorization in some constitutional source. If
that source is the Sweeping Clause, as it normally must be, then the burden is
on the proponent of federal power to prove, affirmatively, that such laws are
"necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" some federal power.43
The requirement in the Sweeping Clause that laws be "necessary and proper"
is not a limitation, implied or otherwise, on congressional power. It is part of
the affirmative grant of power contained in the Sweeping Clause; the phrase
"necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" is part of the definition of
the specific enumerated power in Article I, Section 8, Clause 18. 44 The burden of proof is accordingly on advocates of limitless grants of discretion to
show that such grants are "necessary and proper for carrying into Execution"
federal power.
IL

Grants of Discretion Are Not Always "Necessary"

The meaning of the word "necessary" in the Sweeping Clause has been
often plumbed. The term clearly describes some kind of causal connection
between means and ends: a statute is "necessary" as a means for carrying into
execution federal power if it bears a certain causal-or, as David Engdahl
has termed it, a "telic" 45-connection to the achievement of that end. There
has been much debate since the time of the founding concerning the tightness
of the required causal connection. Some founding-era figures such as
Thomas Jefferson believed that laws under the Sweeping Clause were "necessary" only if they were "means without which the grant of the power would
41 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1728-29.
42 See id. at 1729 ("Article I, § 9 crafts an elaborate set of express restrictions, such as the
ex post facto and bill of attainder clauses, suggesting by negative implication that no other limitations should be recognized.").
43 For a modest defense, or rather an introduction to a defense, of the proposition that the
initial burden of proof is always on the proponent of federal power, see Gary Lawson, Legal
Indeterminacy: Its Cause and Cure, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 411, 425-27 (1996).
44

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.

45

DAVID E. ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM IN A NUTSHELL 20

(2d ed. 1987).
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be nugatory. ' 46 Others such as Alexander Hamilton, as reflected in the preamble to the bill for the First Bank of the United States, maintained that a
law was "necessary" if it "might be conceived to be conducive" to achieving
legislative ends, 47 which calls to mind so-called "rational basis" scrutiny in
modern equal protection doctrine. 48 Still others, such as James Madison,
thought that the word "necessary" as used in the Sweeping Clause required
something in between these two extremes; Madison described the word as
requiring "a definite connection between means and ends" in which the executory law49and the executed power are linked "by some obvious and precise
affinity.
At a very basic level, any debate about the strength of the required
causal connection is largely beside the point for present purposes. 50 Posner
and Vermeule maintain that there is no case even in principle in which a law
that does not transfer formal voting authority to a noncongressional actor is
unconstitutional because of the kind or quantity of discretion that it confers.
If there is even one instance in which a law delegating discretion to the President would, because of the kind or nature of the discretion involved, not be
"necessary . . .for carrying into Execution" federal powers, the Posner/
Vermeule position is wrong. Posner and Vermeule, accordingly, must say
that the word "necessary" is literally meaningless-that there is no logically
possible circumstance in which a grant of discretion can fail to meet the
causal requirement embodied by the word. That is wrong even if one accepts
the "rational basis" approach of Hamilton. Under the Hamiltonian standard,
it may be extremely unlikely that a statute vesting discretion in the President
will ever fail the test of necessity under the Sweeping Clause, and it may be
even more unlikely that a court will enforce whatever restrictions the Constitution imposes, but the restrictions will still exist in principle. That is precisely what Posner and Vermeule deny.
Posner and Vermeule could, of course, claim a kind of moral victory by
arguing that I have not described a "delegation" problem at all, but have
instead described a "lack of congressional authority" problem. Whatever.
The basic idea is that the Constitution places some limits on the extent to
which Congress can vest discretion in the President. Traditionally, that idea
has gone under the label of "nondelegation." It could just as well go under
the label of "exceeding Congress's authority under the Sweeping Clause,"
reserving the "nondelegation" label only for formal transfers of voting authority. I will willingly grant Posner and Vermeule an academic trademark in
the label "nondelegation" if they will grant the existence of the constitutional
46 Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a National Bank, in 19 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 275, 278 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1974).
47 2 ANALS OF CONG. 1948 (1791) (statement of James Madison quoting the preamble to
the first Bank Bill).
48 See, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11 (1992) ("[Tjhe Equal Protection Clause is
satisfied so long as ...the relationship of the classification to its goal is not so attenuated as to
render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.").
49 Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane, supra note 19.
50 For a thorough treatment of the founding-era debate over necessity, see Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183,
188-203 (2003).
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principle that I describe. I doubt they will take the bargain; Posner and
Vermeule do not appear to be arguing about labels. They want to say that
the Constitution does not limit the power of Congress to vest discretion in
other actors.
But let us not draw conclusions too hastily about the effect of the necessity requirement on the nondelegation doctrine (or, if one prefers, the Congress-cannot-vest-too-much-discretion-in-the-President-under-the-SweepingClause doctrine). If the strong Hamiltonian take on the word "necessary" in
the Sweeping Clause is correct, Posner and Vermeule might still be in the
game, at least as a practical matter. They are, after all, clever people, and
clever people can surely gin up causal connections that will sustain even the
most ridiculous statutes. Courts do it routinely. 51 I will even help them out
in the case of the Goodness and Niceness Act: the statute delegating all practical decisionmaking power to the President may well fail the laugh test as a
"necessary" means for carrying into execution the commerce power, but suppose that Congress explains that the purpose of section 2 of the Goodness
and Niceness Act is to relieve Congress of the need to spend time on the
specifics of commercial regulations so that it can concentrate its limited en52
ergy on other matters, such as designating the precise paths of postal routes.
Section 2 of the Act, in other words, would be justified as "necessary" for
carrying into execution the postal power 53 and the commerce power considered as a pair. After all, the Sweeping Clause authorizes laws that carry into
execution any powers granted by the Constitution; nothing in the clause says
that each executory law must uniquely map onto one and only one enumerated power. If the telic connection required by the word "necessary" is loose
enough, there may be literally no cases in which grants of discretion, however
broad, would fail the test of necessity. The word "necessary" in the Sweeping
Clause only poses a serious threat to the Posner/Vermeule thesis if it requires
a substantial enough causal connection between means and ends to have serious bite.

51 See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156-57 (1971) (finding an effect on interstate commerce in a prohibition on local loan-sharking); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111,.
128-29 (1942) (finding an effect on interstate commerce from the consumption of homegrown
wheat).
52 The first post road established by statute was:
From Wisscassett in the district of Maine, to Savannah in Georgia, by the following
route, to wit: Portland, Portsmouth, Newburyport, Ipswich, Salem, Boston, Worcester, Springfield, Hartford, Middletown, New Haven, Stratford, Fairfield, Norwalk,
Stamford, New York, Newark, Elizabethtown, Woodbridge, Brunswick, Princeton,
Trenton, Bristol, Philadelphia, Chester, Wilmington, Elkton, Charlestown, Havre
de Grace, Hartford, Baltimore, Bladensburg, Georgetown, Alexandria, Colchester,
Dumfries, Fredericksburg, Bowling Green, Hanover Court House, Richmond, Petersburg, Halifax, Tarborough, Smithfield, Fayetteville, Newbridge over Drowning
creek, Cheraw Court House, Camden, Statesburg, Columbia, Cambridge and Augusta; and from thence to Savannah ....
Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 232, 232.
53 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7 (granting Congress the power "[t]o establish Post Offices
and post Roads").
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It does. As an original matter, the "rational basis" standard of Hamilton
has no constitutional foundation. 54 The textual case against the Hamiltonian
rational basis interpretation is simply devastating. Textually, it is linguistically bizarre to read the word "necessary" to mean anything like "rationally
related to." Samuel Johnson's 1785 Dictionary of the English Language defined "necessary" as "1. Needful; indispensably requisite. 2. Not free; fatal;
impelled by fate. 3. Conclusive; decisive by inevitable consequence."5 5 This
is not the stuff of which rational basis standards are made. 56 Moreover, when
the Constitution means to give actors unfettered discretion with respect to
means and ends, it knows how to do so. 57 The words "shall be" that precede
"necessary" in the Sweeping Clause hammer home the idea that the clause
means to grant only a limited power.
Intratextual evidence is (if this is possible) even more devastating to the
Hamiltonian position. Consider the Constitution's uses of the words "necessary" and "needful." Samuel Johnson's 1785 dictionary cross-defined "necessary" and "needful" as synonyms: one of Johnson's definitions of "necessary"
was "needful," and Johnson's entire definition of "needful" was simply "necessary; indispensably requisite. 5 8 On two separate occasions, including in
the clause immediately preceding the Sweeping Clause, the Constitution uses
the term "needful" to define Congress's powers: the District and Enclaves
Clause gives Congress power of exclusive legislation over all land acquired
from States "for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and
other needful Buildings," 59 and the Territory and Property Clause authorizes
Congress to make "all needful Rules and Regulations respecting" federal territory or property. 6° Both usages of "needful" involve contexts-federal enclaves, territory, and property-in which Congress acts with the powers of a
general government and is not limited by the enumerations of subject matter
54 As a matter of current doctrine, it has much to commend it-most notably an eight-one
Supreme Court decision from 2004 proclaiming that a law is "necessary" under the Sweeping
Clause when it accomplishes a valid legislative end "by rational means." Sabri v. United States,
124 S.Ct. 1941, 1946 (2004). Justice Thomas was the only member of the Court to get it right.
See id. at 1949-51 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (endorsing Madison's test for
necessity).
55 See SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1785).
is a common mode of expression to say, that it
56 Hamilton's famous observation that "[i]t
is necessary for a government or a person to do this or that thing, when nothing more is intended
or understood, than that the interests of the government or person require, or will be promoted
by, the doing of this or that thing," Final Version of an Opinion on the Constitutionalityof an Act

to Establish a Bank, in 8 THE

PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON

97, 102 (Harold C. Syrett &

Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1965), appears to be blather. I am not a historian, so I cannot claim extensive familiarity with eighteenth-century discourse. But I have examined every usage of the word
"necessary" prior to or contemporaneous with Hamilton's comment that appears in the (considerable) database contained on the American Freedom Library CD-ROM, and none of those
usages even remotely conform to Hamilton's. Samuel Johnson would, unsurprisingly, appear to
have much the better of this particular argument.
2 (Congress may "vest the Appointment of such inferior
57 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
Officers, as they think proper, in the President ... , in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments" (emphasis added)); Lawson & Granger, supra note 38.
58 JOHNSON,
59
60

supra note 55.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (emphasis added).
Id. art. IV, § 3, cl.2 (emphasis added).
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jurisdiction in Article I, Section 8.61 If there was ever going to be occasion
for giving terms such as "needful" or "necessary" a relatively loose construction, it would be when describing the legislative powers of a general government rather than when describing the legislative powers of a limited
government. The Constitution appears to use "needful" when describing a
less demanding means-ends requirement and "necessary" when describing a
stricter one.
There are, of course, also intratextual reasons to reject Jefferson's extreme view of necessity, notwithstanding its strong linguistic pedigree. Chief
Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland62 famously highlighted the Imposts Clause, which provides that "[n]o State shall, without the Consent of
the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what
may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws."' 63 As Marshall
cogently argued in McCulloch, if "necessary" alone already means something
like "indispensable," as Jefferson and the counsel for the State of Maryland
in McCulloch insisted, 64 what sense does it make to add the qualifier "absolutely" to the term? 65 If the Constitution uses "absolutely necessary" to
mean "indispensable," the bare word "necessary" must mean something less.
That is all correct. The big question, however, is how much less than
"indispensable" the word "necessary" means. Hamilton's view is not the
only alternative to Jefferson's view. The textual and intratextual evidence in
favor of a strict interpretation of the word "necessary" does not simply dissolve in the face of the Imposts Clause; it merely stops somewhere short of
where Jefferson would have liked to see it. If one is to take the Constitution
seriously, the task is to find an understanding of the word "necessary" in the
Sweeping Clause that reflects the linguistic and structural evidence that
points towards strict indispensability but that also takes account of the intratextual evidence that sets an upper bound on the tightness of the meansend connection that can plausibly be attributed to the Sweeping Clause.
66
James Madison found as good a solution to that puzzle as one will find.
Madison shared the concerns of Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch about
taking too stringent a view of necessity, though he grounded his concerns in
prudence rather than intratextual analysis. In his 1791 remarks in Congress
opposing the First Bank of the United States, Madison expressly rejected
Jefferson's view of the Sweeping Clause. The reporter described Madison's
position thusly:

67

61 See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136
U.S. 1, 42 (1890) (noting that Congress has "general and plenary" power over federal
territories).
62 McCuloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
2 (emphasis added); see McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at
63 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.
343.
64 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 367 (argument of Mr. Jones) (defining "necessary" as "indispensably requisite").
65 See id. at 414-15.
66 It is hopefully evident that I do not invoke Madison as a binding authority, but simply as
a very smart person who happened to have the right answer to this question.
67 The accuracy of early reports of debates in Congress is subject to serious question. See
James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65
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Those two words ["necessary" and "proper"] had been, by some,
taken in a very limited sense, and were thought only to extend to
the passing of such laws as were indispensably necessary to the very
existence of the government. He [Madison] was disposed to think
that a more liberal construction should be put on them

. . .

for very

essentially necessary to
few acts of the legislature could be proved
68
the absolute existence of government.
At the same time, Madison warned against reading the means-ends requirement for executory laws too loosely:
The essential characteristic of the Government, as composed of limited and enumerated powers, would be destroyed: If instead of direct and incidental means, any means could be used, which in the
language of the preamble to the bill, "might be conceived to be conducive to the successful conducting of the finances; or might
be con'69
ceived to tend to give facility to the obtaining of loans.
How does one navigate between the Scylla of Jeffersonian indispensability and the Charybdis of Hamiltonian rational basis review?
Three decades later, Madison had the answer. "There is," he said in a
letter to Spencer Roane in the aftermath of McCulloch, "certainly a reasonable medium between expounding the Constitution with the strictness of a
penal law, or other ordinary statute, and expounding it with a laxity which
may vary its essential character. ' 70 That reasonable medium, in the context
of the Sweeping Clause, is to require of executory laws "a definite connection
between means and ends,"'71 in which the executory law and the executed
'72
power are linked "by some obvious and precise affinity.
This standard captures, as well as words can capture it, the nature of the
causal connection between legislative means and ends prescribed by the
Sweeping Clause. Textually, Madison's formulation conforms to the ordinary
meaning of the word "necessary," which is not a term that one would likely
use to describe remote and attenuated connections. Structurally, it makes
sense of the other uses of the word "necessary" in the Constitution. Under a
Madisonian view of "necessary," the phrase "absolutely necessary" in the Imposts Clause of Article I, Section 1073 means that without congressional consent, states can only tax imports or exports if their inspection laws would
otherwise be unenforceable. That is a sensible, and even obvious, interpretation of the Imposts Clause: it reads the qualifier "absolutely" to amplify-but
not fundamentally to alter-the meaning of "necessary. ' 74 The word "necessary" also appears in the Recommendation Clause of Article II, which says
TEX. L. REV. 1 (1986). The views of the Sweeping Clause attributed to Madison in the Bank Bill
debate, however, cohere with other, more reliably related views.
68

4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FED-

ERAL CONSTIruTION 417 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES].
69 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1947-48 (1791) (emphasis added).

70 Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane, supra note 19, at 451-52.
71 Id.at 448.
72 Id.
73 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.2.
74 Consider how the Imposts Clause reads if one plugs in a Hamiltonian understanding of
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that the President "shall from time to time give to the Congress Information
of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient. 75 Given that any laws ultimately enacted under the Sweeping Clause must be "necessary," the
Madisonian understanding of "necessary" is an excellent fit with the Recommendation Clause as well.
If anything remotely resembling Madison's view of the means-ends requirement imposed by the Sweeping Clause is correct, the nondelegation
doctrine is very much alive and kicking. If Congress wants to vest discretion
in the President, Congress had better be prepared to show in a direct and
immediate fashion how the precise scope and character of that discretion is
important to the execution of federal powers. 76 Sometimes Congress will
succeed. Sometimes Congress will fail. It is hard to imagine, for instance, a
plausible argument, under a Madisonian view, for the necessity of section 2
of the Goodness and Niceness Act.77 And any failure is enough to defeat
Posner and Vermeule's position.
Modern constitutional law, needless to say, does not reflect Madison's
view of the Sweeping Clause.78 But modern constitutional law bungles almost everything that it touches. The Constitution's original meaning is what
it is, regardless of what courts, past or present, do or do not say about it.
Madison's understanding of the word "necessary" in the Sweeping Clause
makes constitutional sense and other proferred understandings do not. That
is the end of the matter with respect to original meaning, and it is also the
end of the matter with respect to Posner and Vermeule's theory of
nondelegation.
As I have already observed, however, Posner and Vermeule are clever
people. It would not be astonishing if they found a plausible-sounding end
run around even Madison's view of necessity. The Madisonian standard is,
after all, a standard rather than a rule, and standards are notoriously malleable. It would be much more satisfying if there was another route for challenging the constitutionality of congressional grants of discretion besides
arguing that such grants are not neccessary. The Sweeping Clause provides
that route by requiring that laws executing federal powers be not merely
"necessary" but "necessary and proper."
necessity: "No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on
Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely conceivably conducive."
75 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
76 It is tempting to try to relate the views of Jefferson, Madison, and Hamilton to the tiers
of modem equal protection scrutiny, with Jefferson representing strict scrutiny, Madison representing intermediate scrutiny, and Hamilton representing rational basis scrutiny. But that is a
story for another day.
77 See supra p. 238.
78 See supra note 54. It is more equivocal whether McCulloch did so. Madison obviously
thought that McCulloch was wrongly decided, but Madison may have misapplied his own standard. McCulloch clearly rejected the Jeffersonian view of necessity, but it is less clear what view
it actually adopted. Some passages in the opinion seem very Madisonian, see, e.g., McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 422-23 (1819), while others are distinctly Hamiltonian, see,
e.g., id. at 413-15. The point is irrelevant for determining original meaning; the Marshall Court's
interest in the Constitution's original meaning was tepid at best.
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III. Grants of Discretion Are Not Always "Proper"
A good percentage of my professional life has been devoted to the proposition that the word "proper" in the Sweeping Clause imposes limitations
on executory legislation different from and complementary to the limitations
imposed by the word "necessary." The argument for this proposition was
outlined in 1993, in an article coauthored with Patricia B. Granger,'7 9 and a
decade later I applied it to explain why the nondelegation doctrine has a
sound constitutional footing. 80 The bottom-line conclusion is that a "proper"
executory law must conform to "the 'proper' allocation of authority within
the federal government; ... the 'proper' scope of the federal government's
limited jurisdiction with respect to the retained prerogatives of the states;...
and ... the 'proper' scope of the federal government's limited jurisdiction
with respect to the people's retained rights." 81 Put as simply as possible, laws
enacted under the Sweeping Clause "must be consistent with principles of
separation of powers, principles of federalism, and individual rights." 82
The best way to see how this understanding of the word "proper" relates
to the nondelegation doctrine is to examine what Posner and Vermeule don't
like about it. They have two basic objections: that the word "proper" in the
Sweeping Clause is better understood as a redundancy rather than as a separate requirement, and that even if the word "proper" does have independent
significance, it cannot ground a nondelegation principle. Both claims are
wrong. The word "proper" has independent meaning, and it precisely
grounds the traditional nondelegation doctrine.
A.

"Necessary and Proper" Means "Necessary" and "Proper"

If the word "proper" in the Sweeping Clause adds nothing to the word
"necessary," it obviously cannot serve as an independent source for a
nondelegation doctrine; whatever limitations the word "necessary" imposes
on grants of discretion would exhaust the substantive effect of the Sweeping
Clause. That is what Posner and Vermeule maintain. According to them,
Lawson's premise rests on an idiosyncratic reading of the [Sweeping] Clause, one which holds that the single word "proper" incorporates structural principles of separation of powers, federalism, and
individual rights as limits on Congress's affirmative authority .... A
more plausible reading because a less dramatic one, is just that the
phrase "necessary and proper" is an example, among many in the
Constitution, of an internally redundant phrase. Consider other instances in Article I, § 8, such as "Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises" (cl 1), "Government and Regulation" (cl 14), or "organizing,
arming and disciplining (cl 16). On this view, "proper" just means
"appropriate," reinforcing the Supreme Court's longstanding and
79 See Lawson & Granger, supra note 39. For those who wonder about such things: my
coauthor is now Patricia B.G. Lawson. We were married just a few months before the article
came out. In this Article, I continue to refer to her as Ms. Granger to avoid confusion.
80 See Lawson, supra note 14.
81 Lawson & Granger, supra note 39, at 297.
82 Id.
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capacious interpretation of the companion word "necessary" as
'83
meaning "useful" or "conducive to."
In prior work, Ms. Granger and I spent a fair amount of time and energy
demonstrating that the words "necessary" and "proper" in the Sweeping
Clause are not redundant. We devoted, not one, but two subsections in our
article to that specific proposition. 84 Most of the rest of our article implicitly
explained how textual, intratextual, structural, and historical considerations
all support the view that "necessary" and "proper" are distinct terms. The
case for our position, however, is actually much stronger than we let on, as
the ensuing amplification will demonstrate.
The case begins, very modestly and quietly, with the venerable maxim
that one ought to try to give each word in a legal instrument some meaning.
A construction that renders a word meaningless or irrelevant should be disfavored.8 5 As Posner and Vermeule correctly point out, it is easy to make too
much of this maxim. Lawyers love redundancy (as anyone who has ever read
a contract or deed provision along the lines of "give, grant, bargain, sell, and
convey" can attest), 86 and the Constitution was written largely by lawyers.
Although Posner and Vermeule picked really, really bad examples to illustrate the Constitution's willingness to indulge redundancy, 87 there are in fact
a significant number of places in which the Constitution-for reasons of caution, emphasis, or carelessness-contains duplicative provisions. For instance, at least some of the specifically enumerated Article I powers to
prescribe punishments88 are surely duplicative of the general power to prescribe punishment granted by the Sweeping Clause. Many of the provisions
in Sections 2 and 3 of Article II, such as the Commander-in-Chief Clause 89
and the Opinions Clause, 90 replicate and clarify powers conferred on the
President by the Article II Vesting Clause. 91 And as I have vigorously argued
elsewhere, the Bill of Rights was largely redundant given the original Constitution's scheme of enumerated powers. 92 Arguments from redundancy must
be made with care.
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1728 n.20.
See Lawson & Granger, supra note 39, at 275-76 ("B. 'Necessary' and 'Proper' Are
Distinct Requirements"); id. at 289-91 ("B.'Necessary' As Distinct From 'Proper"').
85 See Caleb Nelson, Originalismand Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI.L. REV. 519, 564
(2003) (describing the founding-era pedigree of this principle).
86 See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 120 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
87 See infra pp. 251-52.
88 See, e.g., U.S. CONST.art. I, § 8, cl.
6 (authorizing Congress "[t]o provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States").
89 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service
of the United States ....").
90 Id. ("[H]e may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the
executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices
83

84

91 Id. art. II, § 1, cl.
1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America."); see LAwsON & SEIDMAN, supra note 29, at 46-47 (discussing the superfluity
of the Commander-in-Chief and Opinions Clauses).
92 See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 29, at 189; Gary Lawson, The Bill of Rights As an
Exclamation Point,33 U. RICH. L. REV. 511 (1999).
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But that does not mean that they cannot be made at all. It simply means
that they must be made with care. For a number of reasons, a limited argument from redundancy makes a good measure of sense in the specific context
of the Sweeping Clause.
First, it is easier to find redundancy in the Constitution among provisions
than among words. The Constitution seems more willing to replicate powers
or limitations for emphasis or clarity than to replicate specific terms within a
provision. That is not surprising. In a Constitution driven by a skeptical view
of human nature, and of political actors in particular, 93 one should expect to
see provisions layered over themselves in an effort to anticipate and avoid
potential problems. It is not impossible for the same considerations to affect
the language within specific clauses, but that is a less direct way to confront
risks of interpretative error than is the construction of "back-up systems"
through redundant provisions.
The efforts of Posner and Vermeule to find examples of linguistic redundancy within Article I provide a good illustration of this general constitutional tendency to prefer redundancy of provisions over redundancy of terms.
Posner and Vermeule cavalierly proclaim that the language in the Taxing
Clause authorizing Congress to lay and collect "Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises" 94 is redundant. 95 As Jeffrey Renz has ably demonstrated, however,
the distinction among these different forms of revenue measures was actually
enormously significant to the founding generation, reflecting a basic distinction between revenue measures and regulatory tools. 96 It is especially odd to
treat the phrase "Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises" as redundant when the
Taxing Clause itself distinguishes "Taxes" from "Duties, Imposts and Excises," 97 and the Constitution elsewhere separately treats "Duties and Imposts."98 In fairness to Posner and Vermeule, Madison agreed with them at
least in part; in an 1828 letter, Madison declared that "[t]he term taxes, if
standing alone, would certainly have included duties, imposts, & excises," 99
and the Constitution's own usages of the various taxing terms are sometimes
hard to fathom. For the reasons documented by Professor Renz, however,
Madison's basic assertion that the term "Taxes" is necessarily all encompassing seems clearly false, and a study of founding-era materials on taxation
reveals persistent, even if often fuzzy, demarcations among duties, imposts,
and excises,1°0 especially between imposts and excises. 10 1 Strike one.
93 For a brief discussion of the view of human nature reflected in the Constitution, see
Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Foreword: Two Visions of the Nature of Man, 16 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 1 (1993).
1.
94 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
95 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1728 n.20.
96 See Jeffrey T. Renz, What Spending Clause? (or the President's Paramour):An Examination of the Views of Hamilton, Madison, and Story on Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the
United States Constitution, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 81, 88-94 (1999).
1 ("[A]I Duties, Imposts and Excises [but not Taxes] shall be
97 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.
uniform throughout the United States .....
2.
98 Id. art. I, § 10, cl.
99 Letter from James Madison to Joseph Cabell (Sept. 18, 1828), http://
www.constitution.org/jm/18280918_cabell.htm.
100 For a brief elaboration of the distinction between the various forms of taxation, see
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Posner and Vermeule are also much too eager to announce that the
terms "organizing, arming, and disciplining" in the Militia Clause,10 2 all have
the same meaning. 10 3 An eighteenth-century observer would have been startled to be told that granting Congress power over, say, the disciplining of the
militia also granted Congress power over the militia's structure, command,
training, and equipment. At the Constitutional Convention, Rufus King explained that "by organizing, the committee meant, proportioning the officers
and men-by arming, specifying the kind, size, and calibre of arms-and by
disciplining, prescribing the manual exercise, evolutions, &c,"1 0 4 which is exactly what ordinary language would suggest is meant by the different terms.
Strike two.
Posner and Vermeule's third pitch is the provision granting Congress
power "[t]o make rules for the Government and Regulation" of the military. 105 This provision was incorporated into the Constitution, without any
reported debate or subsequent discussion, directly from the Articles of Confederation. 10 6 I frankly do not know whether "Government" and "Regulation" mean precisely the same thing in this context-and I venture to guess
that Posner and Vermeule are equally clueless. There is, however, some reason to think that the term "Regulation," as it is used in the Constitution on
more than one occasion, has a narrower meaning than "Government," 10 7
though persons better versed in the lore of military history than Posner,
Vermeule, or I are better situated to sort this out. Let's give them a foul tip
on this one and let the reader decide whether the catcher hung on.
The point is not that redundancy of terms in the Constitution, and in
Article I in particular, is nonexistent or inconceivable. Arguments from redundancy or surplusage should not be relied upon to excess. 10 8 But they are
a reasonable starting point for an inquiry into constitutional meaning, especially when the arguments pertain to redundancy of language within a clause
rather than to redundancy of provisions across the Constitution as a whole.
The maxim that one should construe legal documents to avoid linguistic redundancy had some power for the founding generation, and Article I of the
Constitution simply does not exhibit the kind of consistently carefree use of
language that Posner and Vermeule are much too eager to find. Moreover,
the maxim was the linchpin of Chief Justice Marshall's rejection of the strict
A. STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 156, at 103-04 (1854).
101 See, e.g., 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 68, at 368 (Luther Martin's letter).
102 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
16.
103 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1728 n.20.
104 5 JAMES MADISON, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 464
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 1845) (statement of Rufus King); see Brannon P. Denning, Palladium of
Liberty? Causes and Consequences of the Federalizationof State Militiasin the Twentieth Century,
21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 191, 202 (1997).
14; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1728 n.20.
105 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
4 (1777).
106 ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION art. IX,
107 See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L.
REv. 101, 139-42 (2001) (discussing the meaning of the term "regulate" in the Commerce
Clause).
108 See Nelson, supra note 85, at 573-74 (noting Madison's caution about using such rules
of construction).
JOSEPH
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Jeffersonian meaning of "necessity" in McCulloch. Without that maxim as
applied to the Imposts Clause, the textual and intratextual evidence in favor
of the strict Jeffersonian understanding of necessity is simply overwhelming.
Posner and Vermeule probably want to think twice before jettisoning this
maxim too quickly.
The best understanding of the Constitution is that the use of different
words within a clause creates a presumption that the words have independent
meaning. One should not be startled to find that presumption overcome in
particular cases-by, for instance, evidence of consistent linguistic usage that
treats certain terms as synonymous or redundant. But one ought to start an
inquiry into the meaning of the Sweeping Clause with a presumption that the
words "necessary" and "proper" have independent meaning.
There is no consistent pattern of usage that overcomes this initial presumption. There was, in fact, a fair number of founding-era figures, including
such luminaries as Patrick Henry, James Monroe, and Daniel Webster, who
either argued or assumed that the word "proper" added nothing to the
Sweeping Clause. 10 9 One of the nine definitions of "proper" provided by
Samuel Johnson would linguistically sustain the claim that "necessary" and
"proper" were essentially redundant. 110 But the evidence demonstrates that
this was not a standard usage that trumps the otherwise governing interpretative convention. To the contrary, there are numerous instances, from the ratifying conventions through the first few decades under the Constitution, of
people treating "necessary" and "proper" as distinct terms."1 Most of the
definitions found in Johnson's dictionary, including the first four, reflect a
very different meaning than could plausibly be attributed to "necessary."
That is more than enough evidence to sustain the presumption in favor of
independent meaning.
Further examination of the Constitution confirms that "necessary" and
"proper" most likely have independent meaning. There are instances in
which the Constitution uses the word "necessary" without further qualification. 112 At other times, the Constitution uses the word "needful" without
qualification. 13 On one occasion, the Constitution qualifies the term "necessary" with the adjective "absolutely.' 1 14 On another occasion, the Constitu109 See Lawson & Granger, supra note 39, at 275 & n.26 (identifying Henry's and Monroe's
views); id. at 289 (identifying Webster's view).
110 See JOHNSON, supra note 55 (defining "proper" as "1. Peculiar; not belonging to more;
not common. 2. Noting an individual. 3. One's own. It is joined with any of the possessives: as
my proper, their proper. 4. Natural; original. 5. Fit; accommodated; adapted; suitable; qualified.
6. Exact; accurate; just. 7. Not figurative. 8. It seems in Shakespeare to signify, mere; pure. 9.
Elegant; pretty."). The fifth definition seems to reflect the same idea of causal or telic connection as is represented by the word "necessary."
111 Lawson & Granger, supra note 39, at 289-90.
112 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.
3 (imposing a presentment requirement for "[elvery Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives
may be necessary"); id. art. II, § 1, cl.
3 (stating that when the House must choose the President,
"a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice").
113 See id. art. I, § 8, cl.17 (referring to "needful Buildings"); id. art. IV, § 3, cl.
2 (referring
to "all needful Rules and Regulations").
114 See id. art. I, § 10, cl.2.
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tion conjoins "necessary" with "expedient."11 5 The Sweeping Clause uses the
phrase "necessary and proper. ' 116 To an unbiased observer, this at least suggests that the different usages might be meant to convey different messages.
Perhaps on close examination that initial suspicion will dissolve, but the Constitution's pattern of usage of "necessary" and similar terms should at least
raise a flag that the pattern might have significance. At a minimum, the pattern reinforces the presumption that should arise from the general interpretative maxim to try to give each word in a clause some meaning.
Posner and Vermeule offer two responses to this evidence that "necessary" and "proper" most likely have different meanings in the Sweeping
Clause. First, they dismiss the argument as "idiosyncratic. 111 7 Second, they
claim that reading "necessary" and "proper" as redundant is "[a] more plau'1 1 8
sible reading because a less dramatic one.
Because the charge of idiosyncrasy is substantively empty (idiosyncratic
arguments can be either right or wrong), I could easily let it pass. But, of
course, I won't. A word of high praise such as "idiosyncratic" should be reserved only for positions that deserve it; and while I am proud to say that
many of my positions, including some that involve applications of the Sweeping Clause, might well merit such a compliment, 119 the simple view that the
words "necessary" and "proper" have distinct meanings, and that the word
"proper" incorporates some set of structural principles into the Sweeping
Clause, is downright banal. That view has been specifically endorsed by a
large assortment of scholars, including (and these are just the major scholars
who I personally know will not be offended by being named) Randy Barnett,
Steve Calabresi, Stephen Gardbaum, Richard Garnett, Mike Paulsen, and Sai
Prakash. 120 Less to the point for me, though perhaps more to the point for
others, the position has been specifically endorsed by the Supreme Court on
at least three occasions in recent years. 121 As scary as the thought may be, I
1 22
am actually the law on this point.
115 See id. art. II, § 3 (stating that President shall recommend to Congress "such Measures
as he shall judge necessary and expedient").
116 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
117 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1728 n.20.
118 Id. Yes, those are the only arguments that they made.
119 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, ControllingPrecedent:CongressionalRegulation of JudicialDecision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 223-24 (2001) (claiming that the Federal Rules of
Evidence are unconstitutional under the Sweeping Clause).
120 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, ConstitutionalLegitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 145
(2003); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna Prakash, The President'sPower to Execute the Laws,
104 YALE L.J. 541, 587 (1994); Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74
TEX. L. REV. 795, 813-14 (1996); Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism,the Spending Power,
and Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 79 (2003); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the PrecedentialEffect of Roe and Casey?,
109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1568 (2000); Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power,
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 737. Modesty forbids disclosing the full results of my latest
WESTLAW search.
121 See Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456, 462-65 (2003); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 732-33 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997).
122 Those who consider this cause to fear for the future of our republic can console themselves by rereading footnote 54.
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Of course, any or all of the people who agree with me at an abstract
level might well roundly reject much of the specific content that I would attribute to the word "proper," including the specific view that the word "proper"
holds the key to the nondelegation doctrine. The basic idea, however, that
the word "proper" in the Sweeping Clause has something important to say
for structural constitutionalism is now (and it pains me deeply to say this)
blandly conventional. This is hardly proof of the argument's soundness. But
it does leave one wondering how and why the word "idiosyncratic" cropped
up in this context.
As for whether a reading is preferable if it is less "dramatic" than another: I have absolutely no idea what Posner and Vermeule are talking about.
If by "dramatic" they mean "contrary to settled law," they need both to read
the previous paragraph and to explain why drama of that character has any
relevance for an argument concerning original meaning. If by "dramatic"
they mean "having consequences," then I suppose they are right that my
reading of the word "proper" is more "dramatic" than theirs, though I would
be interested to hear them defend the proposition that, all else being equal,
one ought to prefer whatever interpretations of the Constitution have the
fewest consequences.
All things considered, an inquiry into the meaning of the Sweeping
Clause should begin with an inclination to attribute different meanings to the
words "necessary" and "proper." One must stand ready to abandon that inclination if the evidence so warrants, but the presumption should be in favor
of a reading of "proper" that complements rather than replicates the reading
of "necessary."
B.

Laws That Grant Too Much Discretion Are Not "Proper"

It is one thing to say that the word "proper" most likely means something different than the word "necessary." It is another matter altogether to
specify that meaning and to show that it bears on the nondelegation doctrine.
I have spent much of my career presenting and defending the view that a
"proper" law under the Sweeping Clause must respect background principles
of federalism, separation of powers, and individual rights. Some aspects of
that view have been subjected to detailed criticism. 123 This is not the place to
rehearse the entire argument for (as Ms. Granger and I chose to call it) a
123 See J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudenceof the Necessary and ProperClause, 2002 U.
ILL. L. REV. 581, 636-48 (objecting to the use of the word "proper" to refer to limitations other
than means-ends constraints); Thomas B. McAffee, The FederalSystem as Bill of Rights: Original
Understanding,Modem Misreadings, 43 VILL. L. REV. 17, 46-140 (1998) (objecting to using the
word "proper" as a source of individual rather than structural rights). I have elsewhere responded to McAffee, whose criticisms are largely (and wisely) targeted at the claimed implications of the Lawson/Granger interpretation of the Sweeping Clause for individual rights rather
than for its implications for structural arguments. See Lawson, supra note 14, at 348-49. Indeed,
if I understand McAffee correctly, he is likely to be on my side of the present debate. Beck's
argument, as with McAffee's, relies too heavily on history and not heavily enough on structure
and principles. Statements from individuals during and after the founding era, on which Beck
almost entirely focuses, establish the linguistic feasibility of the Lawson/Granger view of the
Sweeping Clause, but they are not the primary sources of evidence concerning the clause's
meaning. The argument must play out in terms of textual, intratextual, and structural argu-
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"jurisdictional" interpretation of the Sweeping Clause. 24 One does not need
to accept everything that I say about the Sweeping Clause-such as its implications for Ninth Amendment analysis' 25 or for congressional statutes regulating the judicial process126-in order to see that the Sweeping Clause
forbids excessive grants of discretion. That turns out to be a relatively easy
case. Accordingly, the "short form" of the argument is sufficient for present
purposes. 127 Even the short-form argument, however, must proceed in steps.
First, I demonstrate that the word "proper" requires laws under the Sweeping Clause to respect principles of federalism and separated powers. Second,
I show that this requirement extends further than a mere obligation not to
violate express constitutional provisions. Third, I show that the requirement
extends even further than an obligation not to violate principles that are intratextually and structurally derivable from the rest of the Constitution.
Fourth, and finally, I show that, under either the second or third step, one of
the principles that must be respected by a "proper" executory law is the principle against exessive grants of discretion.
1. Propriety and Reasonableness
If the word "proper" is to mean something different from the word "necessary," it must refer to something other than the causal connection, or "fit,"
between executory laws and executed powers. If no such plausible meaning
for "proper" is available, or if such a meaning is available in principle but
evidence of original meaning does not support it, one must conclude that the
terms "necessary" and "proper" are essentially the same and that the Constitution uses two words rather than one merely for emphasis.
A plausible meaning for "proper" that distinguishes it from the meaning
of "necessary" is readily available. Samuel Johnson's first definition of
"proper" was "1. Peculiar; not belonging to more; not common."'1 28 His second, third, and fourth definitions were "2. Noting an individual. 3. One's
own .

. .

. 4. Natural; original."'1 29 In the context of a provision granting

legislative power to Congress, this would mean that a law that is "proper...
for carrying into Execution" federal power is a law that peculiarly and naturally belongs to the national legislature. With respect to a legislature of limited and enumerated powers that is situated within a governmental
framework that is divided horizontally by principles of federalism and vertically by principles of separated powers, this would mean that executory laws
must be the sorts of laws that would peculiarly and naturally belong to such a
legislature.
ments, with historical data playing a decidedly supporting role. I discuss Beck's sole textual
argument infra note 142 and accompanying text.
124 As Beck points out, there is some ambiguity in that label, see Beck, supra note 123, at
636 n.364, but I have been unable to think of a better one.
125 See Lawson & Granger, supra note 39, at 326-30.
126 See Lawson, supra note 119.
127 For the long version, see Lawson & Granger, supra note 39, at 297-326.
128 See JOHNSON, supra note 55.
129 Id.
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The general validity of this approach is demonstrated by a number of
textual and structural considerations. First, in the two contexts in which Congress does not serve as a limited legislature, the word "proper" is conspicuously absent. The Territory and Property Clause grants Congress power to
make "all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States. ' 130 The District and Enclave
Clause gives Congress power "[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases

whatsoever"'131 over the nation's capital and federal enclaves within states.

The difference in language between these provisions and the Sweeping
Clause highlights the fundamental distinction between a general legislature,

which describes Congress when it is legislating with respect to federal territory or property, and a limited legislature, which describes Congress when it
is legislating in other contexts. One would not expect Congress, acting as a
general legislature for federal territory, to have to worry about federalism
issues or separation of powers principles that are not specifically reflected in
the text-no more than one would expect a state government in an
equivalent position to have to worry about such things. This is consistent
with the fact that the phrase "necessary and proper" did not appear in any
state constitutions prior to the federal Constitution. The state governments

were all general rather than limited governments, which further points to the
is distinctively tailored to the
idea that the "necessary and proper" phrase
132
limited character of the federal Congress.
Second, an understanding of "necessary and proper" in which "necessary" refers to causal connections, or "fits," and "proper" refers to substantive criteria, such as proportionality and consistency with background
principles, conforms perfectly to the principle of reasonableness (as it is now
called) that in the eighteenth century was at the heart of English administrative law. 1 33 The principle of reasonableness holds' 34 that delegations of implementational power are always subject to the implied condition that

exercises of such power must be reasonable. In the classic application of the
doctrine in Rooke's Case,135 Sir Edward Coke explained that sewer commis-

sioners exceeded their powers by forcing one landowner to bear the costs of
130 U.S. CONST.

art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (emphasis added).

Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (emphasis added).
132 The phrase "necessary and proper" appeared in the Georgia state constitution shortly
after ratification of the federal Constitution. See GA. CorssT. OF 1789, art. I, § 16 ("The general
assembly shall have power to make all laws and ordinances which they shall deem necessary and
proper for the good of the State, which shall not be repugnant to this constitution." (emphasis
added)). For an explanation of how the intriguing phraseology of that provision further demonstrates the limited and limiting character of the word "proper" in the federal Sweeping Clause,
see Lawson & Granger, supra note 39, at 313-14.
133 For a more detailed discussion of the principle of reasonableness and its relevance to
American constitutional interpretation, see LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 29, at 52-57. One
should strongly place the accent on the "Seidman" part of this pairing; I am profoundly indebted
to Guy Seidman for pointing out to me the significance of the principle of reasonableness, of
which I was blissfully unaware in 1993.
134 Even today, the principle of reasonableness is a central precept of English administrative law. See SIR WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 353-54
(8th ed. 2000).
135 Rooke's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 99b, 77 Eng. Rep. 209 (C.P. 1598).
131
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repairs to a river bank that benefited many landowners, even though the authorizing statute placed no limit whatsoever on the commissioners' discretion. 136 Discretion, explained Lord Coke, "is a science or understanding to
discern between falsity and truth, between wrong and right, between shadows
and substance, between equity and colourable glosses and pretences. ' '137 In
other words, delegated power always had to be exercised in a substantively
reasonable fashion that took due account of the rights and interests of affected parties. Later cases elaborated the principle of reasonableness by, for
example, holding in 1773 in Leader v. Moxon 138 that a statute giving paving
commissioners power to make repairs "in such a manner as the commissioners shall think fit" did not authorize raising a street to such a level that it
obstructed a citizen's doors and windows. 139 William Blackstone, who was
one of the judges in the latter case, mentioned the principle of reasonableness, and its grounding in Rooke's Case, in his Commentaries on the Laws of

England,140 a primary reference source for Americans of the founding
generation.
Drawing together the basic features of the principle of reasonableness,
one can say that it requires exercises of delegated power to be causally efficacious, measured and proportionate,and respective of background rights. This

principle constrains the federal executive and judicial powers under the
American Constitution even without textual specification; the principle was
part of the very nature of delegated executive and judicial power in the eighteenth-century English legal tradition.
The principle of reasonableness, however, did not apply to Parliament
(or to the King in Parliament) because Parliament exercised inherent rather
than delegated authority. The federal Congress, of course, possesses only
delegated rather than inherent legislative authority, so if the principle of reasonableness is seen as a facet of delegated power per se, the principle would
bind Congress as well as executive and judicial actors, at least when Congress
was exercising implementational powers (as opposed to the general powers
of an unlimited legislature, which Congress possesses in some limited contexts). But perhaps someone could argue, correctly or incorrectly, that Parliament was exempt from the principle of reasonableness simply because it
was a legislative rather than executive or judicial body, in which case Congress, as a legislative body, would similarly be exempt. A constitutional
drafter who wanted Congress's delegated implementational powers to be
subject to the principle of reasonableness would likely look for some mechanism to prevent this inference. The obvious answer is language that makes
clear that the principle of reasonableness applies in America to all exercises
of delegated implementational authority, including those exercised by the
136 See 23 Hen. 8, c. 5, § 3, cl. 2-3, 4 Stat. at Large 223, 224 (1531) (Eng.) (giving sewer
commissioners power to order repairs "as case shall require, after your wisdoms and discretions"
and granting them power to apportion the costs of repairs as they "shall deem most convenient
to be ordained").
137 Rooke's Case, 5 Co. Rep. at 100a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 210.
138 Leader v. Moxon, 96 Eng. Rep. 546 (K.B. 1773).
139 Id. at 546-47.
140 See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *74.
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legislature. The language "necessary and proper" performs this task quite
elegantly. 141 The term "necessary" describes the element of causal efficacy,
and the term "proper" (interpreted in the Lawson/Granger manner) describes the substantive criteria, such as proportionality and respect for background rights, reflected in the foundational cases such as Rooke's Case and
Leader v. Moxon. The Lawson/Granger interpretation of the Sweeping
Clause reflects the principle of reasonableness that was a basic aspect of delegated power in the late eighteenth century.
The only textual, intratextual, or structural argument against the Lawson/Granger position of which I am aware involves the grammatical structure
of the Sweeping Clause, which
focuses on whether legislation is properfor the purpose of carrying
a given power into execution. The text thus appears to address the
relationship between the legislation and the legislative end in view,
rather than, say, the relationship between Congress and the states.
This inference is strengthened by the fact that the companion term
"necessary" is understood to regulate the means-end relationship. 142
The argument begs the question. It assumes that the phrase "proper for
carrying into Execution" can only concern means-ends relationships, which is
the very point at issue. There is nothing linguistically odd about saying that a
law is not "proper for carrying into Execution" a federal power if the law
violates structural principles or other substantive criteria. 143 It is only odd if
one starts from the premise that the phrase "necessary and proper" only concerns the extent to which laws "carry[ ] into Execution" federal power and
not the manner in which they do so. That is precisely what we are trying to
determine. And given the presumption against construing the terms "necessary" and "proper" to be synonymous, the fact that the word "necessary"
regulates the means-ends relationship supports rather than undercuts the
Lawson/Granger thesis.
Textually, intratextually, and structurally, the word "proper" in the
Sweeping Clause is best understood as a substantive term that does not
merely duplicate the causal function of the word "necessary." It requires
Congress to legislate in a manner that respects substantive considerations. In
the American governmental structure, those substantive considerations include the prerogatives of the states and of competing federal institutions. For
a law to be "proper for carrying into Execution" federal powers, it must be
141 Why not just mention the principle of reasonableness by name? Because it did not have
a name in 1788 that one could just mention.
142 Beck, supra note 123, at 641. Evan Caminker has made a similar point. See Evan H.
Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1127,
1138 n.47 (2001) (noting that "'proper' clearly modifies 'for carrying into execution' rather than
the 'laws' themselves, and thus syntactically serves a teleological function").
143 That is why it is relevant-though not central-to the Lawson/Granger argument that
other people have actually spoken as we do. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 39, at 298-308.
If no one ever used the word "proper" to describe anything other than a causal means-end
connection, it would be harder (though not impossible) to make the case that the word "proper"
describes anything other than a causal means-end connection.
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substantively reasonable in light of the Constitution's scheme of federalism
and separated powers.
2.

Propriety and Externality

All of the foregoing, of course, is highly abstract.144 What does it operationally mean to say that a "proper" executory law must respect principles of
federalism and separated powers?
The Constitution is full of express clauses that concern federalism and
separation of powers. With respect to federalism, for instance, the Slave
Trade Clause specifically forbade Congress until 1808 from interfering with
the decision of states to permit the importation of slaves. 145 With respect to
separation of powers, for instance, the Appointments Clause specifically defines the role of Congress in appointing federal officers: it provides no role
for Congress as such in the appointment process, but provides an advise and
consent role for the Senate and a role for Congress in determining when
146
inferior officers may be appointed without the participation of the Senate.
Perhaps an executory law fails to be "proper" if, but only if, it violates some
such express prohibition.
That would indeed give the word "proper" a meaning different from the
word "necessary," but it would be a remarkably stupid meaning. "Oh, by the

way, don't violate otherwise applicable provisions of the Constitution" is not
an especially helpful injunction. That does not logically rule it out, but it
does incline one to ask to see the evidence that the Constitution contains

such a ridiculous provision. There is no such evidence.
Some arguments about federalism and the separation of powers, of
course, do not rely on express provisions such as the Slave Trade Clause, but
instead rely on more complex and subtle inferences. Suppose that one believes (as Posner and Vermeule, to their great credit, evidently do) that the

Article II Vesting Clause affirmatively grants to the President the "executive
Power," which includes the power to execute federal laws. 147 What if Congress now enacts a statute specifically instructing the President to arrest and
144 Posner and Vermeule do not like abstractions. They regard them as unable to resolve
specific questions, such as the existence vel non of a nondelegation principle. See Posner &
Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1730 n.27 (decrying "banalities about the separation of powers");
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 1340 (complaining about arguments "pitched at a higher
level of abstraction"). That is often enough true to make the point a valuable one. But that does
not mean that abstractions cannot serve as premises in arguments that ultimately yield very
specific conclusions. That is how I am using abstractions-and I suspect that it is how everyone
else that Posner and Vermeule criticize also uses them.
145 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 ("The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of
the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior
to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight .... ").
146 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (decreeing that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint .. . all ... Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper,
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments").
147 See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 120, at 570-71; Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting
Clauses as Power Grants, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1377, 1397-98 (1994).
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prosecute certain suspected offenders and forbidding the President from arresting and prosecuting others? There is no express clause in the Constitution that forbids Congress from doing this. But if the Article II Vesting
Clause is a grant of prosecutorial power to the President, it requires relatively
little by way of inference to say that Congress cannot dictate the exercise of
that power-just as Congress cannot tell courts how to decide specific cases.
When powers are granted to specific institutions within a scheme of divided
government, it makes sense to presume (subject to rebuttal by contrary evidence) that the exercise of those powers cannot formally be dictated by other
actors. Perhaps a law is not "proper for carrying into Execution" federal
power if, and only if, it attempts to control power vested in other actors even
when there is no express prohibition against such control.
This understanding of "proper" would save Posner and Vermeule's argument: the grants of discretion with which the traditional nondelegation doctrine is concerned do not normally attempt to control powers vested in other
actors. But there is nothing to support this understanding of "proper" beyond the fact that it would save Posner and Vermeule's argument. Once it is
admitted that at least some arguments from inference help define what
counts as a "proper" executory law, one cannot rule out candidates for such
arguments a priori. One has to ask in each case whether the particular argument from inference does or does not help define what counts as a "proper"
executory law.
In the case of statutes purporting to control how the President or the
courts carry out their functions, the relevant principle is what I have elsewhere called a principle of decisional independence, "under which each department should be understood to operate outside the direct control of other
departments unless the Constitution instructs to the contrary. ' 148 No such
principle expressly appears in the Constitution. Nonetheless, there are a host
of reasons why such a principle is more consistent with the overall structure
of the Constitution than is the contrary principle that would allow Congress
to dictate the decisionmaking of coordinate departments. 149 It is straightforward and natural to read the word "proper" to refer at least to these kinds of
principles derived from the Constitution's internal structure. Perhaps, then,
the nondelegation principle can be grounded in the same manner as the principle of decisional independence; more on that in a moment.
The final question is whether the word "proper" can ever refer to principles that are not directly derivable from other constitutional provisions. Posner and Vermeule, naturally enough, think not. They claim that "'proper'
has no work to do unless the relevant constitutional principle can be traced to
some other valid source of constitutional law, ' 150 presumably meaning some
other provision(s) of the Constitution. The obvious hypothetical test case
would be a statute enacted in 1789, before ratification of the Bill of Rights,
Lawson, supra note 119, at 204.
See id. at 205-07.
150 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1728 n.20. Others have made similar claims. See,
e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism:United States v. Lopez, 1995 Sup. CT. REV. 125,
201; Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1601, 1628-29 (2000).
148

149
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that authorized the use of general warrants to enforce the customs law (and,
just to make it interesting, further required congressional preapproval of all
newspaper editorials criticizing the use of general warrants unless the newspaper editors are Protestant). There is no express prohibition in the original
Constitution concerning the use of general warrants (or regulations of the
press or religion). Nor are there provisions from which one can make direct
structural inferences against this kind of law comparable to the provisions
from which one can infer a principle of interdepartmental decisional independence. Would the law have been constitutionally authorized by the
Sweeping Clause?
One could, of course, object to at least some of the law's provisions as
not "necessary" and hence beyond the powers granted by the Sweeping
Clause. But can one kill the whole statute on the ground that it is not a law
"proper for carrying into Execution" the customs laws? It is, of course, conceivable that the original Constitution permits such a statute, from which we
were rescued by the Bill of Rights. Many supporters of the Bill of Rights
obviously thought precisely this.151 But it is also conceivable that the reverse
is true. Many defenders of the original Constitution steadfastly maintained
that the unamended Constitution gave Congress no power to authorize general warrants, regulate the press or religion, abolish the civil jury, or violate
other cherished rights. 152 The only plausible textual grounding for this position is the view that a "proper" law must (as the principle of reasonableness
would demand) respect the rights and interests of the people-that is, that
the word "proper" looks beyond the four corners of the rest of the Constitution to background principles that shape the (for lack of a better word)
proper exercise of Congress's implementational legislative power. 5 3 The
question is which conceivable view of the Sweeping Clause is, all things considered, a better view of the Constitution's original meaning.
Is it relevant to this question that the founding-era arguments against the
power of Congress to provide for general warrants and such were not generally based on express references to the word "proper" in the Sweeping
Clause? a54 Of course it is relevant-just as it is relevant that founding-era
debates were not filled with references to Rooke's Case. But the Constitution's meaning consists of what a fully informed audience would have believed, not what the actual audience in fact believed. If a reasonable
observer in 1788 would have listened to my argument about the word
"proper" and its relation to the principle of reasonableness and said, "Yeah,
that seems right," then that reflects the Constitution's original meaning. The
jurisdictional interpretation of "proper" dovetails so elegantly with so many
background principles and understandings that it likely would have comSee Lawson & Granger, supra note 39, at 321-22.
See id. at 317-21, 322-23.
153 This does not mean, of course, that the jurisdictional interpretation of the Sweeping
Clause itself looks "outside" the Constitution. The word "proper" in the Sweeping Clause is as
much a part of the Constitution as is the word "Law" or "Commerce." The question is what the
word "proper," as it is used in the Sweeping Clause, means. Whatever meaning one ultimately
attributes to the word is a meaning that is "inside" rather than "outside" the Constitution.
154 See Beck, supra note 123, at 638-39.
151

152
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manded this kind of hypothetical consensus.155 Or, at least, so goes the
argument.
The nondelegation doctrine is a part of any plausible view of the Sweeping Clause. If one limits the scope of the word "proper" to inferences drawn
primarily from intratextual and structural considerations, the nondelegation
principle has the same status as the principle of decisional independence: it is
not a principle expressly stated in the Constitution, but it is a better inference
from the overall structure of the Constitution than is the contrary principle.
For fairly obvious reasons advanced by Alexander and Prakash in their response to Posner and Vermeule's thesis,1 56 and by Mike Rappaport 157 in an
important discussion that is given short shrift by Posner and Vermeule, 158 it is
a far more plausible view of the Constitution's structural and procedural provisions to say that they limit the extent to which discretion can be conferred
than to say the contrary.
Consider just the structure of Article I, Section 8. Its first seventeen
clauses contain provisions that give Congress power to perform such actions
as to "lay and collect," "borrow," "regulate," "establish," "coin .... regulate . . . , and fix," "provide," "establish," "promote ...by securing," "constitute," "define and punish," "declare . . . , grant . . . , and make Rules
concerning," "raise and support," "provide and maintain," "make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of," "provide for calling forth," "provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining," and "exercise exclusive Legislation in
all Cases whatsoever, over."1 59 At the end of the list is a clause giving Congress power to make laws that are "necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution" these other actions. Exactly who, in this governmental scheme, is
supposed to be doing the lion's share of the laying and collecting, borrowing,
regulating, establishing, coining, regulating, fixing, providing, establishing,
promoting by securing, constituting, defining and punishing, declaring, granting, making Rules concerning, raising and supporting, providing and maintaining, making Rules for the Government and Regulation of, providing for
calling forth, providing for organizing, arming, and disciplining, and exercising exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over? It is not difficult to
reach the conclusion that a law that puts the substance of these tasks in someone else's hands is not "proper for carrying into Execution" these congressional powers because it puts too much strain on the obvious architecture of
the document considered as a whole. The point is not that one can logically
deduce, in a strict fashion, the nondelegation doctrine from principles of federalism, separation of powers, bicameralism, and checks and balances, no
more than one can logically deduce a principle of decisional independence.
155 That does not necessarily mean that the word "proper" draws a principle of state sovereign immunity into the Sweeping Clause, as the Supreme Court has held in Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 732-33 (1999). I haven't studied the question carefully enough to have a strong view
either way.
156 Alexander & Prakash, supra note 5, at 1300-03.
157 Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line Item Veto: A
New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and Its Implications for Clinton v. City of New
York, 76 TUL. L. REV. 265, 305-09 (2001).
158 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1730 n.27.
159 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1-17.
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The point, rather, is that the traditional nondelegation principle is more consistent with the government created by the Constitution than is the nondelegation principle advanced by Posner and Vermeule. And at least one
function of the word "proper" in the Sweeping Clause is to "textualize" these
background principles to insure that Congress obeys them when legislating
under the Sweeping Clause.1 60
If the word "proper" imports the full range of background principles
that frame the powers of the limited legislature in a limited, divided government created by the Constitution, it is even more obvious that extreme grants
of discretion are out. How could it be "proper"-or consistent with the principle of reasonableness-to make hash out of the Constitution's allocation of
governmental responsibilities? One can, as Posner and Vermeule have done,
logically imagine such a regime. It is much harder to imagine a fully informed eighteenth-century observer choosing the Posner/Vermeule regime as
the best understanding of what constitutes a "necessary and proper" means
for executing federal power.
All that is left-and all that was really there in the first place-is Posner
and Vermeule's insistence that the Constitution's allocation of governmental
responsibilities is purely formal: the President's "executive Power" just
means the power to execute whatever statutes Congress enacts (and the judicial power presumably means the power to decide cases in accordance with
whatever laws Congress enacts). Those laws, of course, cannot violate express constitutional provisions 161-the President cannot execute a law delegating the formal right to vote or abolishing the slave trade before 1808-but
otherwise, they say, the Constitution has nothing to say about the matter.
As should be evident by now, this is fundamentally wrong for two complementary reasons. First, it begs (or, more precisely, incorrectly answers) all
of the relevant questions concerning the meaning of the Sweeping Clause.
The Sweeping Clause does not authorize any conceivable laws for implementing federal powers that do not violate express constitutional prohibitions. That is not what it says, and it is not what it means. If a statute "for
carrying into Execution" federal power is not "necessary and proper" for that
purpose, the President cannot execute it because it does not count as a law.
A law telling the President to go forth and promote goodness and niceness is
no more "proper" than is a law forbidding the President from arresting certain individuals, telling courts to rule for certain plaintiffs, or (if one is prepared to take this step) authorizing the use of general warrants in 1789.
Second, Posner and Vermeule's position turns on the view that the "executive Power," in its law-implementing guise, 162 is nothing more than the
160 Does that mean that Congress need not obey these principles when legislating through
vehicles other than the Sweeping Clause, such as the Territory and Property Clause, or perhaps
the Commerce Clause directly? For an answer of "mostly yes," see Lawson, supra note 119, at
208-10.
161 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1724, 1755.
162 The "executive Power" has other guises as well, such as the power to command the
military, to make treaties, to govern occupied territory during wartime, and to conduct foreign
affairs. See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 29, at 47-51; Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D.
Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2000).

2005]

Discretion as Delegation

formal power to execute whatever statutes Congress enacts. 163 But they nowhere explain why this view of the executive power is remotely plausiblemuch less more plausible than an alternative view such as, "the power to
execute statutes, provided that those statutes do not put the President in the
position of making rules for governance on important matters, though the
President is permitted to make rules on ancillary matters." This alternative
view is exactly what the traditional nondelegation doctrine understands the
"executive Power" to involve. That understanding of the "executive Power"
has been advanced and defended by Mike Rappaport, who argues that this
narrower conception of "executive Power" would have seemed more plausible to an eighteenth-century observer because it better serves the Constitu-

tion's scheme of separated powers, bicameralism, federalism, and checks and
balances. 164 Posner and Vermeule (weakly) respond that statutes vesting discretion formally comply with this scheme because they must be enacted in
accordance with the Constitution's "presentment," "bicameralism," and federalism provisions, 165 but that badly misses the point. The argument is not, as
I have said, that one can rigorously deduce a nondelegation principle from
the Constitution's other provisions. The argument is instead that an objective, fully informed eighteenth-century observer would be more likely to as-

sent to a view of executive power that complements principles underlying the
Constitution's formal lawmaking provisions. Posner and Vermeule do not
seem seriously to consider the possibility that the "executive Power" (and the

corresponding duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed"' 166)
extends only to statutes of a particular kind and character.167 That is a grave

mistake.
It is clear that the "executive Power" does not include the power to act

without statutory authorization by, for instance, acting as though there is a
statute prohibiting abortions on federal property when there is not.168 It is
also clear that the "executive Power" does not include the power to "inter-

pret" laws in ridiculous ways by, for instance, "construing" the Administrative Procedure Act's definition of adjudication 169 to prohibit abortions on
163 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1725-30. Under this view, if Congress enacts
unconstitutional statutes, then of course they may not be executed, but not because of any formal properties of the "executive Power."
164 See Rappaport, supra note 157, at 305-09.
165 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1750-51.
166 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
167 They do, however, raise questions about the extent to which broad grants of discretion
would or would not disserve the values protected by presentment, bicameralism, etc. See Posner
& Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1750. Those are not the right questions to raise. For whatever
reasons, to serve whatever values, the Constitution contains provisions that instantiate certain
principles of separated powers, bicameralism, federalism, and checks and balances. All else being equal, it makes more sense to assume that other provisions, relating to the same general
subject matter, have meanings that cohere with the instantiated principles than it does to assume
the contrary. That is the true meaning of formalism: the provisions have meaning independent
of the extent to which they actually serve the values that motivated them.
168 On this, at least, we all agree. See Lawson, supra note 14, at 340; Posner & Vermeule,
supra note 1, at 1725; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 1333.
169 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (2000) (defining "'adjudication"' as "agency process for the formulation of an order").
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federal property.170 The principle of reasonableness holds at least that much.
But if not everything done by the President in the guise of executing a statute
is an exercise of the "executive Power," it is fair to ask why presidential action pursuant to crisp, clear legislative commands cannot ever be said to exceed the limits of the "executive Power" as the term is used in the
Constitution. If a reasonable observer in 1788 was presented with the Goodness and Niceness Act, would he or she say that presidential regulations pursuant to that statute were simply an exercise of "executive Power," or would
he or she instead say that the power goes beyond the substantive content of
the "executive Power"? Though the Rappaport/Lawson view that "executive
Power" is bounded by certain exercises of discretion is less rule-like than the
purely formal Posner/Vermeule view, there is no good reason to think that all
constitutional provisions should be interpreted in the most rule-like fashion
possible. If the best understanding of the Constitution as a whole has the
"executive Power" stop before it reaches the power to make important rules
for governance, Congress cannot authorize the President to make such rules.
And for essentially the same reasons that the Sweeping Clause is best read
not to authorize Congress to grant limitless discretion to the President, the
Article II Vesting Clause is best read not to permit the President to receive
any such grant of discretion from Congress.
But didn't the First Congress grant precisely such limitless discretion to
the President? Posner and Vermeule have invoked, as did opponents of the
nondelegation doctrine before them, 71 a series of statutes from the First
Congress that vested considerable discretion in executive agents. 1 72 I dealt
with these statutes at length in an earlier work. Most fundamentally, I argued that enactments of the First Congress are at best very weak evidence of
original meaning. 173 Moreover, I showed that most of these early statutes
grant a kind and quantity of discretion that is consistent with the traditional
nondelegation doctrine. 174 The nondelegation doctrine, after all, does not
forbid Congress from vesting any discretion, or even a considerable degree of
discretion, in other agents. It permits Congress to grant discretion with respect to matters ancillary to a statutory scheme but forbids grants of discretion on fundamental matters. The First Congress generally conformed to this
principle. The few statutes that do not seem consistent with the traditional
nondelegation doctrine are no threat to the nondelegation doctrine because
See Lawson, supra note 14, at 339-40, 344-45.
See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 6, at 66.
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1735-36; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 1340.
See Lawson, supra note 14, at 398.
Enactments of early Congresses are particularly suspect because members of Congress, even those who participated in the drafting and ratification of the Constitution, are not disinterested observers. They are political actors, responding to
political as well as legal influences, who are eminently capable of making mistakes
about the meaning of the Constitution. Their work product constitutes post-enactment legislative history that ranks fairly low down on the hierarchy of reliable evidence concerning original meaning.
Id. This echoes a much more elaborate argument from Steve Calabresi and Sai Prakash. See
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 120, at 551-59.
174 See Lawson, supra note 14, at 396-402.
170
171
172
173

2005]

Discretion as Delegation

they either involve subjects, such as military or foreign affairs matters, in
which the Constitution permits Congress to grant the President more than
the usual measure of discretion 175 or represent mistakes committed by a fallible First Congress.
Posner and Vermeule are unconvinced. Without disputing the general
methodological objection to heavy reliance on early legislative enactments,
they claim that because "[a]ll of the affirmative originalist evidence for the
delegation metaphor ...

is also post-ratification material[,] [t]o take Law-

son's general objection seriously is to wipe out all of the affirmative founding-era evidence that nondelegation proponents possess."'1 76 Posner and

Vermeule have a strange understanding of what counts as "affirmative
originalist evidence.' 1 77 The argument for the nondelegation doctrine that I
have constructed, here and elsewhere, does not rely at all on "snippets from
Madison and early legislators."'1 78 Nor could it, given my methodological
predilections. Such statements are (even if only barely) admissible evidence
of original meaning, but they are hardly the focus of argument for a reasonable-observer originalist. The "affirmative originalist evidence" for the
nondelegation doctrine consists precisely of the arguments from text, structure, and principle that point towards a construction of the Sweeping Clause
(and the Article II Vesting Clause) that limits the extent to which Congress
may confer discretion on the President. That argument does not rely, in any
fundamental sense, on evidence of concrete historical understandings, from
the First Congress or otherwise.
With respect to the substance of the statutes, Posner and Vermeule retreat to their favorite redoubt: the ad hominem. "Nondelegation proponents," they exclaim, "may chip away at the early statutes as much as they
please, adding ingenious epicycles to square the statutes with the theory, but
the cumulative impression these statutes create is that early Congresses just
didn't take constitutional objections to delegation very seriously.' 1 79 I confess to being quite fond of the "ingenious epicycles" label-the epicycles, of
course, were astoundingly accurate as tools for predicting planetary motions
in all but the most extreme cases-but I am a bit less willing to accept the
characterization of a detailed, painstaking discussion of founding-era statutes,'180 superimposed upon another article by Mike Rappaport that further
addresses some of these statutes,' 8 ' as an attempt to "chip away" at anything.
I rather think that, between us, Professor Rappaport and I convincingly
crushed their claims about founding-era statutes. The point,2 however, is only
8
of minor interest as far as original meaning is concerned.
See Rappaport, supra note 157, at 310 & n.154, 346-53.
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1736-37 n.61.
177 They also have a mistaken view about exactly who has the burden of producing affirmative evidence on this point. See supra p. 242.
178 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1736 n.61. I made that very clear in my last article
on this subject. See Lawson, supra note 14, at 341 n.51.
179 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1737 n.61.
180 See Lawson, supra note 14, at 398-402.
181 See Rappaport, supra note 157.
182 Of even less interest, I suppose, is evidence from the Second Congress showing deep
constitutional concern on the part of some members about delegations of broad authority to the
175

176
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Conclusion
The evidence from text, intratextual analysis, structure, and background
principles that forms the bedrock of any good (reasonable-observer) originalist argument overwhelmingly shows that the Constitution imposes limits on
the extent to which Congress can grant discretion to other actors. That
leaves the difficult task of figuring out exactly how much and what kind of
discretion Congress may grant. 183 But that task, rather than the burial of the
nondelegation doctrine, is the task set upon us by the Constitution.

President with respect to the location of post roads. See Lawson, supra note 14, at 402-03.
Posner and Vermeule do not appear to have anything to say about this evidence.
183 For my lengthy crack at this task, see id. at 353-95.

